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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EXTENSION OF STATE ACTION
Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc.
220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963)
In Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc.,1 plaintiff, a Negro, insti-
tuted a class action for declaratory relief to restrain a motel owner and
its resident manager from continuing a policy of discrimination against
Negroes. The land upon which the motel was erected had been pur-
chased with private funds from the Nashville Housing Authority, a
public body.2 Furthermore, restrictive covenants were incorporated in
the deed to insure future conformity with an urban redevelopment plan.'
The issue before the federal court was whether the private owner's
acts of discrimination could be considered illegal state action under the
fourteenth amendment. The court held that the state was sufficiently
involved in the conduct of the private motel owner to bring the case
within the constitutional provision of the fourteenth amendment which
prohibits state action denying equal protection of the laws to any person.4
"State action" was found in the pervasive forms of governmental partici-
pation in the urban redevelopment project and continuing governmental
controls over the use of the property.
Defendant contended that the land was purchased at arm's length
from the state for its full market value. It was argued that the building
was erected with private funds, at no cost to the public, and that the
owner paid normal ad valorem and other taxes. While admitting a
policy of racial discrimination, defendant denied that this took place
under color of state law5 or that it constituted in any way an arm or
instrumentality of the State of Tennessee.' The motel owner claimed
immunity from the provisions of the fourteenth amendment on the
ground that the acts complained of were of the purely private type re-
peatedly held to be outside the purview of the federal constitution since
the decision in the Civil Rights Cases.'
1. 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-801 to 13-1007 (1955).
3. Article V, Restrictive Covenants, Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project, Nashville, Ten-
nessee (1958), Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1, 6 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
4. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
5. As required by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1959) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1959).
6. This condition precedent was established by Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases:
"It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individ-
ual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883). For a summary of what the Court has considered to be state action, see AMTEAu,
COm?.mARIS ON THE CONSrTON OF TI UNrrm STATES 143 (1960).
7. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). No matter how far the concept of state action has been extended,
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The court rejected these arguments and found "far reaching and sig-
nificant" state participation.' This conclusion was based on the rationale
of the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.' In
Burton, the Court reiterated that the equal protection clause erects no
shield against merely private conduct.'" Yet it struck down racial dis-
crimination in a privately-owned restaurant after finding significant in-
volvement of the state in the leasing of space from a public body."
Lower courts promptly applied the test used in the Burton case. Dis-
crimination has been held unconstitutional when it occurred in a restau-
rant operating under a lease from a city. 2 Where a sale of land was
involved, discrimination at a privately-owned golf course was held sus-
ceptible to the fourteenth amendment because the title to the land con-
tained a clause under which it might revert to the city, a prior owner."
Prior to the Burton case, courts had repeatedly rejected claims that
state regulation or control made discrimination in public accommoda-
tions a form of state action. The instant opinion refers to two de-
cisions in this area as being overruled by the Burton decision.'" First, in
Barnes v. City of Gadsden,'" a restrictive covenant passed to a private
owner from a city housing authority (as in Smith) and actually was
directed against racial discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a decision by a lower court which could not find
state action in subsequent discrimination by private owners. Second, in
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town,'6 land for a housing project had been cleared
by New York City under its power of eminent domain and tax exemp-
tions had been granted to the private owners. On appeal, the lower
court's decision that the actions of the private owners were immune to
the constitutional prohibition was upheld.
The development of the cases applying the fourteenth amendment
and interpreting what constitutes "state action" seem to indicate a virtual
no decision has failed to reiterate that more than "purely private" acts must be asserted and
proved if the fourteenth amendment is to be invoked. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S.
1. (1947) (judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant held unconstitutional). The opin-
ion in Shelley v. Kramer is most often quoted to show that "the fourteenth amendment erects
no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v.
Kramer, id at 13.
8. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1, 8 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
9. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
10. Id. at 721-22.
11. Ibid.
12. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
13. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911
(1962).
14. Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
15. 174 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ala. 1958), afId, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 915 (1960).
16. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
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